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CASENOTES
the fatber-husband will be free to divorce the girl at aly time without being
absolutely liable for her support. This is true despite the court's statement
that easing the financial burden of support does not facilitate divorce. - '
Neither should the court declare valid a void agreement because the agreemcnt was motivated by a desire to make the child lcgitimate. \Vith the
post-war rise of the divorcc rate,22 the best interests of society are not
served by a ruling which validates an agreement requiring the girl's family
to indemnify the husband for support of the girl.
ROBERT

J.

FRIEDMAN

CRIMINAL LAW-DEATH OF A CO-FELONFELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
Defendant participated with the deceased in the commission of all
armed robbery. The victim of the robbery justifiably killed one of the

felons. Defendant was indicted for first degree murder for the death of
his co-felon. Held, a co-felon is guilty of murder where the victim of an
armed robbery justifiably kills the other felon. Commonwealth v. Thomas,

382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 205 (1955).
An involuntary killing occurring in consequence of an unlawful act
constitutes either murder or manslaughter, depending on the nature of
such act.1 Under the common law, a homicide committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony is murder, though the killing
may have been involuntary or unintentional.- Today, all but three states

have by statute adopted the common law doctrine of felony-murder? Both
at common law and under statute, a necessary element in all murder cases
is malice, or intent to kill. 4 Where a homicide is committed in the perpetration of a violent felony, the turpitude of the act supplies the element
of deliberate and premeditated malice. 5 In order to apply the felony-murder

21. See note 10 supra which indicates that better reasoned opinions consider that
easing the financial burden of support does facilitate divorce.
22. U.S. BUREAU Oi THEn CENSUS, STATISTIGAL ABSTRACT OF TIE UNITED STATES:
1955 (Seventy-sixth edition) 76 (1955).
1. Baker v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 420, 264 S.XV. 1069 (1924); State v. Werner,
144 [a. 380, 80 So. 596 (1919); Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 54 N.E. 551
(1899); State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917).
2. State v. Serna, 69 Ariz. 181, 211 P.2d 455 (1950); TIonage v. State, 182 Ark.
74, 30 S.W.2d 865 (1930); People v. Gilbert, 22 Cal.2d 522, P.2d 9 (1943); State v.
Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 42 A.2d 354 (1945); Lynch v. State, 207 Ca. 325, 61 S.E.2d
495 (1950); People v. Weber, 401 111.584, 83 N.E.2d 297 (1948); People v. Wright,
315 Mich. 81, 23 N.W.2d 213 (1946); Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305,
19 A.2d 98 (1941); State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 382, 12 P.2d 1110 (1932).
3. Kentucky, South Carolina, and Maine are the only jurisdictions not having
Felony-Murder Statutes.
4. Leavine v. State, 109 FlI. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933); State v. Rogers, 141
Neb. 6, 2 N.W.2d 529 (1942); State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940).
5. People v. Watson, 132 Cal. App.2d 70, 281 P.2d 564 (1955); State v. Garcia.
159 Neb. 571, 68 N.W.2d 151 (1955); 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1599, "If
one shoots at A. and misses him, but kills B., this is murder, because of the previous
felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other."

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
doctrine the homicide must either be in furtherance of the felony,6 or the
7
felony must be the proximate cause of the homicide.
It is not necessary, however, that the felon's act cause the death, 8 or
that the person killed be the victim of the robbcry., In Commonwealth v.
Almeida,'0 where there was no proof who fired the fatal shot, the court
held that the death of a policeman was the proximate result of the defendants' armed robbery. There is some authority in support of the view that
one engaged in the commission of a felony can not be held criminally liable
for the unintentional killing of another by one not a participant in the

felony." Several cases have held, contrary to the principal case, that the
doctrine of felony-murder is not intended to apply to the death of an
accomplice occurring during the commission of a violent felony. -' In
People v. Ferin,"L where one co-felon was killed during the commission
of arson, the court acquitted the other felon by holding the felony-murder
doctrine inapplicable on the rationale that the killing was not in the furtherance of the felony, but entirely opposed to it.
The felony-murder doctrine, which Florida has adopted by statute, 4
has been applied in this jurisdiction many times.' In Hornbeck v. State, 6
the court held that where a third person is killed in the exchange of shots
between police officers and felons during the perpetration of robbery or
the flight from the scene of the- robbery, the felons are guilty of murder,
regardless of whether the fatal shot was fired by a felon or an officer and
regardless of whether the person killed was the victim of the robbery. It is
6. State v. Williams, 81 Ala. 1, 1 So 179 (1887); State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392,
175 So. 4 (1937); People v. LaBarbera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.S. 257 (1936).
7. State v. Cots, 126 Conn. 48, 9 A.2d 138 (1939); State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299,
34 So.2d 785 (1948); State v. Clover, 330 Mo 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932); Commonwealth v. Mover, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947); Commonwealth v. Kelloy,
333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d 805 (1939).
8. People v. Payne, 359 I1. 246, 194 N.E. 543 (1935). The victim of a robbery
was accidently killed by a person trying to prevent the robbery. The robber was held
guilty of first degree murder, because it was to be anticipated that the robbery would
meet with resistance during which the victim of the robbery might he shot by a third
person attempting to prevent the robbery.
9. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934). A person resisting a
robbery shot and killed the robber's hostage. The felons were held guilty of murder
because the death of the hostage was the natural result of the felonious act,
10. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
11. Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Commonwealth v. Moore,
121 Ky. 97, 88 S.V. 1085 (1905); People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489
(1930).
12. People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); State v. Oxeudine,
187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924).
13. 203 Cal, 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928).
14. FLa. STAT. § 782.04 (1953).
The unlawful killing of a human being . . . when committed in the perpetration of . . . robbery shall be murder in the first degree, and shall be
punishable by death.
15. Henderson v. State, 70 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1954); Brown v. State, 61 So.2d 640
(Fla. 1852); Smith v. State, 129 Fa. 388, 176 So. 506 (1937); Leavine v. State,
109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933); Rivers v. State, 75 Fla. 401, 78 So 343 (1918).
16. 77 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955).
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questionable, even in light of this decision, whether Florida would apply
the felony-murder doctrine where the deceased is a co-felon. Prior to the
instant case, the only cases holding the doctrine applicable to the death
of a co-felon, were those in which a co-felon either accidently caused his
own death 17 or was unintentionally killed by another felon.",
The principal case presents a far-reaching application of the felony
murder doctrine, for it is, as far as can be ascertained, the first time the
doctrine has been applied where the victim of a felony justifiably kills a
co-felon. The majority based its decision on the concept that the death
of the co-felon was the natural consequence of the felonious act. But, how
can one be guilty of murder for a killing that was unquestionably a justifiable homicide? Here, the deceased was a perpetrator of the robbery whose
death was certainly not in furtherance of the crime. The conviction of his
co-felon seems to be a wholly unwarranted extension of the doctrine. It
is submitted, therefore, that the felony murder doctrine should not be one
of limitless application. \Vhere the homicide is justifiable, it should not
form the basis of a murder charge against the co-felon.
ROBERT L. SmtVIN

CRIMINAL LAW-PARDONS-HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS
The defendant's sentence was set aside, and a greater sentence imposed under the habitual offender law,' predicated upon a prior felony
conviction for which a full pardon had been given. Held, reversed, the
prior conviction may not be considered under the habitual offender law
when a full pardon has been granted. Fields v. State, 85 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1956).
There is conflict of authority as to the effect of a pardon.2 The minority
view takes the position that a pardon has the effect of blotting out both
the legal consequences and the gilt of the offender. This rationale has
its basis in Blackstone's definition that ". . . the effect of such pardon by
the king is to make the offender a new man. .. " 4Ex parte Garland-- is an
illustrative case. There the court held a pardon reached both the punish17. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
18. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App.2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).

1. FLA.

STAT.

§ 775.09 (1953).

2. See Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. Riv. 177 (1939);
Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 ItARV. L. REv. 647 (1915).
3. State v. Childers, 197 La. 715, 2 So.2d. 189 (1941); State v. Martin, 59
Ohio St. 212, 52 N.E. 188 (1898); Ex Parte Crump, 10 Okla. Crim. 133, 135 Pac 428
(1913); Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 194. 20 S.W.2d 416 (1925), rev'd, Jones v.
State, 141 Tex. Crim. 70, 147 S.W.2d 508 (1941); Edwards v. Commonwealth,
78 Va. 39, 49 Am. Rep. 377 (1883).
4, 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1773.
5. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).

